Relations between the United States and Pakistan remind one of a dog going around in circles trying to catch its tail. Only in this case we do not know which is which. We have the happy yelps, frustrating growls, lightning fast actions but in the end, no forward movement. It’s like static motion.
The $800 million aid suspension and a lot of hullabaloo later we are still going around in circles. It’s more of the same. Gen David Petraeus lands in Rawalpindi to meet the army’s number one while DG ISI dashes to US to meet the number two of the CIA. As in the past, both sides guardedly talk about “making progress,” followed by a few public actions like limited issuance of visas to US intelligence and defence personnel. But then right in the wake of Gen Pasha’s visit we also see the FBI swooping on Ghulam Nabi Fai and arresting him on allegations of being an ISI agent in the US. We have been in this policy wasteland before. This confusion needs to end and the nation must be told whether we are grudging allies or sworn enemies. You cannot vilify the Raymond Davises of the world one day and facilitate their escape the next.
With prudent policies and a pragmatic leadership we could do without US aid (sadly, we have neither at the moment) but we cannot do without being on good terms with the world’s only economic and military superpower. And why should we anyway. Similarly, the US cannot wish us away or bomb a nuclear armed 180 million nation into oblivion. It needs to work with us to attain a reasonable solution to the Afghan question. Afghanistan lies smack in the midst of the world’s present and future energy equation and thus a perpetual fix in the Western world’s priorities.
By now both the US and Pakistan should have developed a rudimentary understanding at least of each other’s red lines and no-do dogmas, but that hasn’t happened. We have not stopped lying and the Americans have not started telling the whole truth either, and herein lies the biggest problem of all: trust deficit.
Pakistan cannot sleep with Haqqani every night and expect to wake up the next morning with the US. There is no defence of either the fatally flawed policy of treating the LeT and its ilk as undeclared non-state protectors of declared national interests. At the same time, the US too must recognise that it cannot legitimately expect Pakistan to allow a free run to illegitimate US war combatants. Building the operational capacity of the Pakistani armed forces through genuine regular soldiers is one thing and wanting to bring in “contractors” and Special Forces with undeclared parallel agendas another. It cannot tell us to bomb every Taliban while itself opening discreet dialogue channels with the Taliban to Pakistan’s exclusion.
The “withholding” of the military package over a mundane pretext has exposed the real underlying cause of conflict between the two grudging allies: That of opposite policy timeframes, which in turn are creating opposing policy objectives.
The US wants to enforce a slam-dunk military strategy designed to serve its immediate short-term political ends in its Afghanistan exit strategy. Pakistan, on the other hand, is rightly approaching the situation with a long-term perspective. The US will one day count its unfortunate dead, the billions wasted on the Afghan side and leave the region. Pakistan cannot. Any mistakes in this endgame phase, made by any of the many players involved will have disastrous ramifications for Pakistan. The US must appreciate this legitimate concern while lambasting the Pakistani authorities for their other possibly illegitimate indulgences. Also, there cannot be a timely Western withdrawal of the US and the West from Afghanistan by forcing Pakistan into a corner. If matters are forced to a grinding halt in Pakistan, then the Afghanistan timetable also goes haywire.
Then we have Leon Panetta’s warning that having got Osama, the US now needed to get another 20 Al-Qaeda top guns to effectively destroy the terrorist organisation. In the same breath it was also conveyed that Ayman al Zawahiri was hiding in Pakistan and protected by the Haqqani network. Couple that with the declared US policy of resorting to the “targeted use of all elements of US national power” to eliminate terrorist targets and the plans become clear. In the coming days, there will be a manifold increase in drone attacks inside Pakistan and in a much wider area as well.
The two sides have their fair share of differences and contradictions. Officially, the khakis have nothing to do with the Haqqani network but in reality the Haqqanis are perceived as a “Pakistan-friendly asset” in any post-US pullout dispensation in Afghanistan. The US obviously disagrees, but how it can cause a negotiated end to the Afghan stalemate without talking to its main adversary is anybody’s guess.
When one side fails to vanquish the other militarily, the solution only comes through dialogue between sworn enemies. Instead of nurturing a culture of patient diplomacy like the British and the Chinese, the US has forever relied on its coercive military diplomacy of forced arrangements. This shock and awe diplomacy may work in the short term but such agreements break down the moment the US scales down its military threat or physical presence. Afghanistan and Pakistan will prove no exception.
The aid suspension is also not being perceived as military-exclusive by Islamabad. Contrary to the impression being given otherwise, the political leadership is not viewing the aid suspension as being military-specific and thereby a “welcome body blow” to the reeling military establishment, its traditional forced partner in the power equation. The political leadership is convinced that the Americans will next be breathing hard down its neck over the Iran issue. President Zardari and his advisors are very unhappy at what one described as “harsh tactics” being adopted to dissuade them from cosying up to the Iranians. And, unknown to many in Pakistan, the strengthening Pakistan-Iran equation is becoming a serious source of friction between Washington and Islamabad.
Pakistan and the US must eschew talking publicly at each other and instead create a mutually acceptable positive policy framework. Exploiting the negativities of this critical relationship has helped neither.
The majority of Pakistanis do not dislike Americans as a people but their wrath is actually aimed at Washington, controlled by vested interests including the armament and nuclear lobby. There would be a sea change in popular perception were the US to align itself with the long-term peaceful objectives of Pakistan and not alienate it in pursuance of short-term palliatives. Pakistan for its part must realise that it is a serious world out there, and for it to survive individually it must recognise and act according to the collective globally recognised principles of responsible national behaviour. We cannot lie or cheat our way through. We must regain our credibility. We may be passing through difficult times but we need not make them impossible.
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