The late Richard Holbrooke felt that Obama’s over reliance on the military in Afghanistan had about it the “whiff of Vietnam.” If so, he was spot-on. The war is on the cusp of becoming a larger regional conflict. Following the drone attacks earlier this week and that on a Pakistani border post, it’s only a question of time before either a drone is brought down or retaliatory fire from a Pakistani outpost on the Pakistani-Afghan border causes American deaths. Thereafter, Pakistan’s ties with America, already hanging by a single thread, will go into free fall. Perhaps, they already are in a free fall; and all that remains is to see whether, when they hit the ground, they will survive the fall or signal the expansion of the war to Pakistan.
Surprisingly, despite Pakistan’s bitter experiences with the American connection, it never occurred to our military or civilian leaders that for a Muslim democracy, as distinct from family-run and -owned fiefdoms and kingdoms of the Gulf, an alliance with a post-9/11 America would be a deadweight. And that, sooner or later, it would drag them down in the eyes of their own people. Or that an alternative alliance or compact was needed in place of the one forged and stubbornly retained with Washington, although America had shown in 1990 that it far preferred to wash its hands of Pakistan. Alas, an inert and sidelined foreign service, a military unable to rethink and plan ahead, immersed in acquisition of plots and pelf, and politicians who were, and still are, mostly functional illiterates, they all sat on their hands and did nothing.
Fortuitously, an alternative arrangement which might be the best way out of the US straitjacket is in the offing, namely, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Becoming a part of the SCO makes much better sense. It is part of the region in which we are physically embedded as it straddles South and Central Asia. Both Pakistan and India may soon be admitted as full members, along with Afghanistan, which should make it a lot easier to tackle the problems of the Af-Pak region on a truly regional basis. Since the SCO has Russia and China as key sponsors, it will not be dominated either by one or the other but will be more collective. In due course, Iran is likely to be admitted as a full member too.
Potentially, the SCO is the best recipe for ensuring that the region does not become a playground for US rivalries with Russia and China; or for Bush-era ambitions focused on Central Asia (both oil and gas and putting western China and Russia in a squeeze). It would be a big plus for Russia and China if the SCO grows into something more significant. Indeed, it is only by combining their strength that they can hope to keep the US firmly in check; help to mitigate China-India rivalry at least in our region, though not perhaps in East Asia; reduce India’s dependence on the US in our region; and make it a lot easier for us to establish ourselves as a regional economic hub for western China and Central Asia in terms of the access we can provide to the sprawling Indian Ocean region. Besides, it would bring in Russian investment in gas and pipeline development in which that country has considerable experience and interest and some spare cash.
Actually, the participation of China and the reinforcement provided by Russia give the SCO an actual and potential clout that exceeds anything that the US has to offer. And if India, Iran and Pakistan join it, then consider the SCO’s potential size and value as an economic market. The SCO could see us through our congenital energy deficiency at least as long as hydrocarbons remain the mainstay of the global economy. So the economic dimension is hugely important in itself.
No less importantly, the SCO would reduce US options to play an aggressive or overambitious role in the region, thereby making it easier to re-establish our ties with them as friends rather than as incompatible lovers or irreconcilable allies. Our dependence on the US would decline dramatically, except that we would have to find resources to tide over our current deficits for which we will have to dig deeper into our own pockets and do things that we should have done earlier, such as widen our tax bases, tighten our belts over the short term.
It is good that Zardari visited Moscow and ties with Russia have indeed been growing under his watch. It is even better that Gilani is now in China, hopefully to let them know that we wish to refashion ties with the US and look to friends like China to step up to the plate as we get ready to jettison the American alliance. The Chinese are likely to be receptive, as they recall how much and for how long they had to endure American hostility till Nixon did his volte face in 1971. In fact they will remember that we helped to make that happen for them. Besides, both Russia and China have a deep and abiding concern about extremism and terrorism. Indeed, while the SCO did not start off as a bulwark against extremism and terrorism—it was meant to deal with issues of border security on a cooperative basis—these issues have become increasingly of major concern in response to regional and international developments.
The SCO framework might also be a better one for tackling India-Pakistan issues as well, though we must not expect much on Kashmir. That would have to be kept bilateral. But the regional context for tackling our concerns about India vis-a-vis Afghanistan and with Afghanistan via-a-vis the Taliban would be a lot better than it is currently. No one has the wherewithal or the desire to settle the issue by war, except the American generals. Finally the SCO would also be a good antidote to the virulent anti-US sentiment in Pakistan.
But it would require us to shift to Russia and China our sources of primary military equipment from the US high-tech stuff (which in any case would not be forthcoming as long as our growing differences with them remain irreconcilable). In time, if the situation around our country improves, Europe too could become an option. Concerns about high-tech military equipment would diminish dramatically, of course, if we can achieve a breakthrough in Afghanistan, which would reduce our India-related concerns on the western border and may also lead to a reduction of thereat perceptions on our eastern border.
In any case, our options, thanks to our disastrous ties with the US, are limited and we have to optimise from available options. Among them, the SCO stands out.
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