Sanctuaries and safe havens-II Dealing with the problem By Syed Talat Hussain

Posted in Wednesday, 20 July 2011
by Admin


THERE are several problems with the way Pakistan`s security establishment has chosen to handle the issue of safe havens and sanctuaries.

The most obvious problem is that the response to whether or not terrorists operate from Pakistani soil has been varied. This speaks either of slippery conduct or policy confusion. We have never tried to find a logical and coherent answer, backed by analysis and wider reasoning, to explain our case to the world.

The second problem is that many of the responses we have given contradict one another: `no, we don`t have sanctuaries` versus `we need more capability to eliminate them`. These contradictions, and there are several more, have undermined our credibility.

The third problem is that dozens of small and big operations in and around Fata have yielded enough empirical evidence to establish that militants do operate from our side of the border because if they did not we would not have 140,000 troops stationed here. Moreover, after Osama bin Laden`s death, denial is not an option.

The fourth problem is that with intelligence, reconnaissance and satellite assets being used so widely in this area, by not just one country but several countries which mostly share these with each other, it is virtually impossible to maintain ambiguity over the sanctuaries` issue.

The fifth problem is that within our own set-up, both military and political, there is a considerable body of opinion that there are large sanctuaries inside these areas from where militants move and operate freely.

All of this calls for a comprehensive and realistic policy on the issue of safe havens and sanctuaries. A useful start would be to define precisely in accordance with international law terms such as `sanctuaries`, `safe havens`, `hideouts`, `hiding places` and `refuge`.

In international legal opinion, there is considerable difference between these terms and the responsibility that these entail for the states concerned also varies. What is happening now is that `sanctuary` is so loosely used that any place where even a suspicion exists that a suspected terrorist has passed is categorised as a `sanctuary`.

This means that practically the whole of Pakistan`s territory can be declared a sanctuary on the mere suspicion that certain types of terrorists might have used them for any purpose.

Parallel to this attempt at engaging with the world on defining what `sanctuary` actually means, we need to genuinely move against some of these sanctuaries on our own. If we don`t want to do it militarily, we have to do it administratively or politically. But we have to show results in neutralising them.

Our reluctance or inability to do so does not gel with our international commitments of not allowing our territory to be used for terrorist actions, nor does this support our rhetoric that we are in control of our own territory.

In these actions against sanctuaries, the quantum of international cooperation and input needs to be determined and, it is strongly recommended, made public. If international cooperation replaces international intrusion and the goals and purposes of this cooperation are made public, fewer eyebrows will be raised in Pakistan.

The admission of international cooperation (as per our own requirement) to address the issue of sanctuaries should become acceptable domestically if the nation sees the results in the shape of less domestic terrorism and suicide bombings.

To create effective public support for this cooperation, genuine evidence of real cases of sanctuaries must be provided so that a more informed debate about the problem can take place. If the recovery of caches of arms from ordinary criminals can be splashed across the media, those hiding international terrorists deserve the same limelight.

All these components (and there can be many more) need to be fitted into a serious and well-thought-out review of the issue of safe havens and sanctuaries on our soil. The aim of the review should be to a) develop convincing explanations (not defence) of how and why these sanctuaries exist, and b) to discard the useless theories that we have employed as reflex riposte every time a charge is made that terrorists come and go freely from Pakistani soil.

In the wake of the Osama bin Laden episode, the issue has become fundamental to how the world would now see our performance on the counter-terror front. It is the chief concern around which Washington and Delhi can both campaign for global pressure and even sanctions on Pakistan.

This makes the sanctuaries` issue crucial to our international image, besides, arguably, being one of the most daunting defence policy challenges the country is faced with today. But the most significant of all, without addressing the issue, domestic peace and stability shall remain elusive.

All efforts to dismantle the local jihadi industry would be in vain without first dealing with the hideouts where global terrorists break bread with local recidivists and militant missionaries and plan attacks both inside and outside Pakistan.

Our old policy (if we ever really had one) on the safe havens` and sanctuaries` issue is dead. We should find a new one soon, before the UN Security Council creates one for us. — Concluded